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I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden;  
he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”, 
pointing to a tree that is near us.  
Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him:  
“This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.”  
On Certainty § 467 
If philosophy is disease, the sceptic must surely have a 
terminal case. There seems to be no relief for one so ill. 
However, in On Certainty Wittgenstein offers us a new way 
to examine the problem, a new treatment, as it were. As 
Wittgenstein’s methodology is so uniquely multi-faceted, 
so too is his attack on the sceptic, and as it has been said 
before, Wittgenstein has a marvelous capacity, not for 
solving problems, but dissolving them. We should not 
therefore be surprised that the die-hard sceptic remains 
unconvinced by Wittgenstein’s attack; it is not the sort of 
maneuver the sceptic is used to. Indeed, at times it does 
not seem like an attack at all. The sceptic must beware 
however; behind Wittgenstein’s oblique style there lies an 
assault of such subtlety and caliber that only a master of 
could deliver it. But really, for all his mastery, for all his 
philosophical poignancy, how effective is Wittgenstein’s 
criticism? It is certainly of a very different order than those 
we have seen in the past, but can Wittgenstein ultimately 
avoid the charge of “question begging” that have plagued 
so many before him? The question is somewhat compli-
cated in the case of Wittgenstein, not only by his philoso-
phical position, but also by his methodology.  
To be sure there is justification,  
but justification comes to an end.  
On Certainty § 192 
While there are many points upon which Wittgenstein 
definitely appears to attack the sceptic, he simultaneously 
denies those very foundations the “anti-sceptical” position 
typically relies on. As Wittgenstein famously remarks in § 
166 of On Certainty, “The difficulty is to realize the ground-
lessness of our believing.” No matter what the nature of 
our reasoning may be, those reasons must eventually give 
out. It appears as though Wittgenstein’s writings suggest a 
kind of cultural relativism that ultimately abandons univer-
sal objective knowledge to those realms inaccessible to 
humanity. But while this may seem to play right into the 
sceptic’s hands, he does so in a manner that somewhat 
deflates the traditional sceptic, though ultimately, I shall 
argue, cannot abolish scepticism entirely. Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy may very well create a new, somewhat more 
sophisticated sceptic, as it were. 
I said I would combat the other man, - but wouldn’t I give 
him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? And the 
end of reasons comes persuasion.  
(Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)  
On Certainty § 612 
Wittgenstein has a strange way of affecting his readers; he 
influences us without our full knowledge of how it is that 
we have been swayed. But given the intimacy of Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy with his methodology, his form with his 
content, I am led to question how much of Wittgenstein’s 
own influence is, in fact, persuasion. Indeed, at times it 
seems as though Wittgenstein does not so much convince 
us, but convert us. Though all in all, this “persuasive” 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy should not surprise us. 
If he truly wishes to abandon a universal ground or logic 
from which we may depart, as he does indeed seem to, 
what other option does the man have? He cannot argue 
his position, he can truly only present it. As he writes in § 
109 of the Philosophical Investigations, “We must do away 
with explanation, and description alone must take its 
place.” It just so happens that he does this in a very 
persuasive manner. Think here of all those metaphors (like 
the beetle in the box for example), and the snappy slogans 
(“Back to the rough ground!”), Surely this is no accident; 
these devices play an integral role, not only in Wittgen-
stein’s method, but in his philosophy as well. 
Not every false belief of this sort is a mistake. 
On Certainty § 72 
It is impossible to discuss Wittgenstein’s philosophy apart 
from his methodology; each is like a mirror of the other. As 
I have discussed my concerns regarding the persuasive 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s method, so must I in turn discuss 
the philosophic thread that reflects this tendency of his. 
The philosophic theme I would like to pursue here is the 
theme of mistake and madness. This distinction is 
fundamental to his critique of the sceptic: it is through this 
distinction that Wittgenstein demonstrates what he calls 
the “intellectual distance” that can exist between people, 
and, I believe, the cultural relativism that makes it 
impossible for us to genuinely argue against those with 
radically different positions from our own. The point being, 
if it can be shown that the sceptic is not as “intellectually 
distant” as they may at first appear, we have a field upon 
which to “combat” them. If the sceptic can be shown to 
participate in our “form of life”, as it were, there must be 
some sense of rationality in which we share, and thus a 
basis on which to judge right from wrong, a mistake from 
madness. So, while Wittgenstein does, as I say, deflate the 
traditional sceptic, he does not explicitly deny the 
possibility of a sceptical “form of life”, however intellectually 
distant these people might be. 
If my friend were to one day imagine that he had been 
living for a long time past in such and such a place, etc. 
etc., I should not call this a mistake, but rather a mental 
disturbance, perhaps a transient one.  
On Certainly § 71 
The theme of madness and mistake is one that runs 
throughout On Certainty. How is it, Wittgenstein asks, do 
we distinguish between these “mental disturbances” and a 
simple, ordinary mistake? And where does the sceptic fall 
upon this scale? Most reasonable people (including a few 
philosophers,) believe the sceptic is certainly misguided, 
but is the sceptic mistaken, or mad? To answer this 
question we must investigate how it is that such a strange 
and destructive error should arise in the first place. The 
source of the problem, according to Wittgenstein, like the 
source of all philosophical problems, is, not surprisingly, 
the misuse of language. In deviating from our ordinary 
natural language games, as the sceptic does, our words 
are placed in an unnatural context, they take on a meaning 
unfamiliar to us, and thus the problems that arise from 
such an abuse are truly not the problems we perceive 
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them to be. In the context of On Certainty, this point is 
clearly raised in response to G. E. Moore’s blatant episte-
mic assertions. 
This situation is thus not the same for a proposition like  
“At a distance from the sun there is a planet” and  
“Here is a hand” (namely my own hand). The second can’t 
be called a hypothesis.  
But there isn’t a sharp boundary between them.  
On Certainty § 52 
Moore does not know these things he claims to (like “Here 
is one hand, and here is another.”), argues Wittgenstein, 
for knowledge is not an appropriate characterization of 
those paradigmatic understandings that are actually the 
foundations of knowledge. As he states in § 205, “If the 
true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor 
yet false.” The paradigms are not proper objects of 
knowledge themselves, for knowledge requires a number 
of conditions that the paradigms do not meet; knowledge 
must, among other things, be open to verifiability and 
doubt. Wittgenstein is famously of the opinion that where 
doubt is impossible, so too is knowledge. The language 
game of knowledge requires the possibility of satisfying 
oneself, and this is not possible in the case of Moore’s 
paradigms. Take the statements from § 52 for example, 
the claim “there is a planet this distance from the sun” is an 
empirical proposition, obviously open to empirical 
investigation. “Here is a hand”, however, is not. Any proof 
one could provide for such a claim is no more certain than 
the claim itself. One cannot say how one knows “here is a 
hand”, for these sorts of propositions, within a system of 
others like it, are the conditions for empirical investigation 
in the first place. As Wittgenstein writes in § 515, “If my 
name is not L.W., how can I rely on what is meant by ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ anymore?!” We should not therefore claim that 
we know these paradigmatic propositions, claims Witt-
genstein, but that they “stand fast”. 
So is the hypothesis possible, that all the things around us 
don’t exist? Would that not be like the hypothesis of our 
having miscalculated in all our calculations?  
On Certainty § 55 
Wittgenstein makes a very subtle move here in § 55. 
Notice that he asks, “Is the hypothesis possible…?” He 
does not directly address the question whether the belief 
itself is possible, only the hypothesis. This is not irrelevant; 
it is exactly the position the traditional sceptic is in. The 
sceptic asks us to consider, isn’t it possible that we may be 
a brain in a vat, or that there is an evil demon who 
deceives us in everything we do, etc.? The sceptic 
presents us here with what appears to be hypothesis, but 
as a genuine hypothesis these possibilities ultimately fail. 
They are not genuine, according to Wittgenstein, because 
they are not verifiable, and an hypothesis that is not 
verifiable is no hypothesis at all. In other words: these 
questions the sceptic typically raise do not satisfy the 
criterial requirements of an hypothesis. This is why, I 
believe, Wittgenstein alludes to the idea of calculation here 
in § 55. It is much easier to accept the notion that we 
cannot have been wrong in all our calculations, because 
we have so obviously created the conditions under which 
calculation occurs. This just is calculation. “This is how one 
calculates. Calculation is this” (§ 47); we are the ones who 
have defined it as such, so how could we be wrong? On 
the other hand, we tend to conceive of empirical proposi-
tions as somehow independent of us, and thus we feel that 
a mistake is more appropriate here. Most people find it 
much easier to doubt an empirical proposition such as 
“This is chair” rather than a logical proposition like “1+1=2”. 
This does not mean that it is any more certain however. 
But nor am I making a mistake about twelve times twelve 
being a hundred and forty-four. I may say later that I was 
confused just now, but not that I was making a mistake.  
On Certainty § 304 
Of course, it is one thing to say that one has no doubts, 
but quite another to abandon the possibility of changing 
one’s mind later. Similarly, while it may not possible for us 
to mistake calculating 1+1, we can certainly imagine those 
who may calculate differently from us. Wittgenstein 
presents us with a case of this in § 137 of the Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics III. He writes there,  
Imagine someone bewitched so that he calculated: 
  
 3 3 3 3 2  
 ∩∩∩∩∩ i.e. 4x3+2=10 
  ⎜ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Surely we would not say of this man that he was simply 
making a mistake, but that some madness had overcome 
him, “bewitched” as it were. But what if he was just one of 
many who calculated like this, should we call them all 
insane? It would seem that in this case we could call them 
neither, even though their view disagrees with ours. Our 
beliefs form a great system of mutual support, propositions 
such as these have a place only within that system; at a 
certain distance outside of that system we no longer have 
an adequate test for truth. How then are we to judge? This 
is the situation we are presented with when we consider 
Wittgenstein’s “strange tribes”. 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to 
an end; - but the end is not certain propositions striking us 
as immediately true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our 
part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language game.  
On Certainty § 204 
Genuine comparison is only possible within sufficiently 
similar language games, but there seems to be some 
confusion regarding the boundaries of those language 
games. We should not, of course, be surprised at this 
given Wittgenstein’s views on vagueness, however, even 
given this, what would then count as a test whether 
someone operates sufficiently within our system? There 
must be some manner for determining just how intellectu-
ally distant we are from another, particularly if we wish to 
address the sceptic, for if there were none, there could be 
no genuine disagreement, discussion, or debate. Certainly 
discussion and disagreements do occur, but how do we 
know when someone occupies enough of our “intellectual 
vicinity” that we are genuinely entitled to accuse them of 
falsehood? For this test I believe that Wittgenstein has 
none other than the idea of action in mind. Is not this what 
all the talk about Goethe and the squirrels is about? The 
foundations of a language game do not rest upon propo-
sitions, parts of language themselves requiring grounding, 
but upon an “ungrounded way of acting”. In this sense, we 
have a common denominator against which different sys-
tems of believe may be compared. The primacy of action is 
fundamental to them all. 
My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair 
over there, or a door, and so on. – I tell a friend e.g.: “Take 
that chair over there”, “Shut the door”, etc, etc.  
On Certainty § 7 
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Wittgenstein is fond of characterizing our foundations as 
“bedrock”. Our most fundamental source of action is 
fossilized within that bedrock, it is the ground from which or 
“form of life” springs. These bedrock ‘beliefs’ that inform 
our actions are so basic they cannot be genuinely 
expressed through language, and as such, neither can 
they be genuinely questioned. They can only be lived, and 
thus lived, they are lived with certainty. As Wittgenstein 
writes in § 334, “My life consists in my being content to 
accept many things.” The sceptics thus betray themselves. 
Every time the sceptic sits down, eats lunch, or addresses 
another person, they betray their certainty that the chair 
exists, food nourishes, and that their friend is not truly a 
mindless automaton whose bodily actions are governed by 
an evil genius bent on deceiving them. How genuine is a 
doubt that cannot be upheld? Wittgenstein claims that 
such a doubt is no doubt at all. Words can lie, they can be 
manipulated, they can be ingenuine; actions, of the 
fundamental sort Wittgenstein discusses here, cannot. 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language.” (PI § 109) Isn’t that 
why Wittgenstein wants to replace argument with descrip-
tion? To disclose the abuse of words that philosophers are 
so fond of, Wittgenstein attempts to reveal their use. This 
is no coincidence. 
But mightn’t I be crazy and not doubting what I absolutely 
ought to doubt?  
On Certainty § 223 
Of course, this critique only works for the traditional 
sceptic, the philosophical sceptic, that is, the one with 
which we share a “form of life.” Ultimately, Wittgenstein 
cannot deny the possibility of an unusually sceptical 
foreigner, or even a dramatic shift in our own “form of life”. 
Perhaps this is the reason he himself battled with insanity 
for much of his life. Wittgenstein’s philosophy offers us no 
assurance of truth or sanity. We must recognize and 
accept, perhaps even appreciate, this constant threat that 
madness presents. When we fully realize this, if this is 
even possible, we will have made our peace with scepti-
cism, not as a problem to be solved, but as an imminent 
fact of human existence; a reality that forces us to 
abandon our search for the foundation and begin an 
explorations of ourselves and our limitations. We must not 
flee from our finitude; we must embrace it.  
If someone asked us “but is it true?” we would say “yes” to 
him; and if he demands grounds we might say 
 “I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you 
too will think the same.”  
On Certainty § 206 
So, in this great twenty-five hundred year struggle with 
scepticism, where does Wittgenstein sit? Wittgenstein 
occupies a strange place. On the one hand, he deflates 
the traditional sceptic, claiming there sceptical concerns 
are impossible to uphold, and thus without meaning, but 
on the other hand, he presents an unmistakably sceptical 
position himself, but one that is inevitably placed within 
some (albeit, foreign) system of beliefs. I’m not sure to 
what extent Wittgenstein ultimately begs the question 
directly, though certainly he presupposes many things 
central to his position. Though amazingly, even this is 
placed within a system of beliefs, and thus, to some extent, 
justified. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is an attempt to convert 
the reader; it is an attempt to establish not an absolute 
foundation, but a common ground. Wittgenstein is truly a 
man of his time. A master of his times, he is a master of 
style, and a master of question begging, for he begs those 
questions that only readers with a common ground will 
allow him to beg, because we beg them as well. 
Scepticism dissolved?  
